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I. Introduction
Three-parent in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) is a controversial
procedure that offers the possibility of preventing the inheritance of
genetically caused mitochondrial disease, sparing future generations
1
from a range of incapacitating conditions. Due to the use of a
controversial form of cloning technology, the procedure is currently

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014.
1. Nick Collins, ‘Three-parent Baby’ Fertility Technique Could be Made Legal, THE
TELEGRAPH (Sep. 17, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9546214/
Three-parent-baby-fertility-technique-be-made-legal.html.
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banned in both the United Kingdom and the United States. British
law bans the use of manipulated embryos for reproductive purposes,
while United States law has banned gene transfer procedures since
3
2001 and will continue to ban them until they are proven safe.
4
However, due to the many benefits of the procedure, which could
5
potentially outweigh any ethical concerns, three-parent IVF may
6
become legal in the United Kingdom as early as this year. If the
procedure is legalized in the United Kingdom, it might launch a
public debate about whether it should be legalized in the United
States.
If the procedure was to be made legal in the United States, it is
7
unclear how the states would legally view the donor parent. Part I of
this note will review the general history of IVF, and its evolution into
an accepted practice. It will specifically focus on the history of
surrogacy and state laws regarding the rights afforded to surrogate
parents.
The rights that donor parents in three-parent IVF
procedures receive will most likely parallel the rights afforded to
surrogate parents. Part II of this note will explain mitochondrial
disease, IVF and three-parent IVF in more detail. Part III will delve
into the legal treatment of surrogates by analyzing three cases
illustrating the types of surrogates and their treatment under the law.
Part IV will look at how states differ in their legal treatment of
surrogacy, and the impact three-parent IVF may have on state and
federal law, especially in regard to lesbian co-parents and United
States citizenship. Part V will propose ways to change existing law or
incorporate three-parent IVF into the existing law using current
surrogacy law as a model.

2. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Conceivable Changes: Effectuating Infertile Couples’
Emotional Ties to Frozen Embryos Through New Disposition Options, 79 UMKC L. Rev.
315, 316–317 (2010).
3. Id. at 315.
4. “[T]he obvious good is in permanently removing a genetic mutation that will
alleviate the suffering of future generations.” Stephanie Pederson, The Cost-Benefit
Equation of Three-Parent IVF, THE INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.theinter
national.org/articles/253-the-cost-benefit-equation-of-three-parent.
5. There are also unknown risks regarding how this will affect future generations.
The ethical concern is the slippery slope argument: “[t]here are concerns that if threeparent IVF treatment is legalized, it will pave the way for other more extreme germline
therapies and manipulations, namely the creation [of] designer babies.” Id.
6. Collins, supra note 1.
7. State laws regarding surrogacy differ and what courts may choose to do or should
do will be a complicated issue to address. See infra Part III.
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II. Background
The human body contains tissues and organs, all of which are
composed of many cells. Each cell, with the exception of red blood
cells, contains a cell nucleus, which in turn contains one full copy of a
8
person’s nuclear DNA. The nuclear DNA from both parents is
9
genetically inherited by that couple’s children. Nuclear DNA is also
the type of DNA most people think of when they hear the term
“DNA.” Each cell also contains many mitochondria, which are
inherited solely from the mother and contain their own DNA—
10
mitochondrial DNA. Mitochondria have many functions, but are
primarily known for generating our cells’ chemical energy, which is
11
required to keep human bodies functioning properly.
Malfunctioning mitochondrial DNA results approximately one
in 6,500 children being born with serious diseases, including “fatal
heart problems, liver failure, brain disorders, blindness and muscular
12
weakness.”
Mitochondrial diseases result in these physical
deficiencies because mitochondria are involved in many of the
important internal functions of the body, such as generating most of
our cells’ chemical energy, signaling between cells leading to cellular
differentiation or cell death, and controlling the cell cycle and cell
13
growth. Without sufficient chemical energy and proper signaling, a
human body is not able to function properly, leading to debilitating
14
conditions.
A. Three-Parent IVF

In order to combat mitochondrial diseases, British scientists have
mastered a controversial technique. Using cloning technology the
researchers have discovered a way to prevent the inheritability of

8. See Wikipedia, Nuclear DNA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_DNA
(describing nuclear deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) inherited from two parents, rather than
matrilineally as with mitochondrial DNA) (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
9. Id.
10. See Wikipedia, Mitochondrion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitochondrion
(defining mitochondrial DNA) (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
11. Id.
12. Ben Hirschler, DNA Egg Swap Prevents Rare Diseases in Babies, Reuters
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/14/us-dna-disease-idUSTRE63
D3O B20100414.
13. See Wikipedia, supra note 10.
14. For a list of conditions see Possible Symptoms, UNITED MITOCHONDRIAL
DISEASE FOUNDATION, http://www.umdf.org/site/pp.aspx?c=8qKOJ0MvF7LUG&b=
7934631 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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these diseases. Since mitochondria, and its individual mitochondrial
DNA, follow a pattern of maternal inheritance, they are inherited
16
only from mothers. Scientists utilized this pattern of inheritance
17
when developing the technique to prevent mitochondrial diseases.
By swapping DNA between two fertilized eggs, the researchers
created a new embryo containing the core nuclear DNA from the
mother and father and the healthy mitochondrial DNA from a female
18
egg donor. The implication of this procedure, once it is in effect, is
that mitochondrial disease could be completely eradicated for future
19
generations. The controversy that arises out of this procedure is that
thirty-seven genes, out of more than twenty thousand genes, are
20
found in the mitochondria. Therefore, the baby inherits about 0.2%
of its genetic information from the donor parent, resulting in the baby
21
having three genetic parents.
There are currently two variations of the technique being
debated: the spindle transfer method and the pronuclear transfer
22
method.
The spindle transfer method involves placing nuclear
material from the mother’s egg into a donor egg “shell,” which
23
contains healthy mitochondria but no nuclear DNA. In this method
the egg is fertilized with the father’s sperm in vitro, but not until after
24
the transfer occurs. Since an unfertilized egg is more susceptible to
damage, researchers believe that the more complex pronuclear
transfer method, which involves two in vitro fertilizations, will be the
25
preferred, future technique. The alternative to spindle transfer is
pronuclear transfer. Under this method, genetic material in an
embryo created from donor sperm and egg is removed and replaced
with the genetic material from a second egg created with the parental
26
sperm and egg, a process called enucleation.
15. Hirschler, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Pederson, supra note 4.
20. Hirchler, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. Michael Hanlon, Three-parent IVF is a chance to create a generation free from
mitochondrial diseases, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 17, 2012),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
science/9548387/Three-parent-IVF-is-a-chance-to-create-a-generation-free-frommitochondrial-diseases.html.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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B. IVF

To understand the current turmoil caused by three-parent IVF
procedures, a look back at the history of IVF procedures is necessary.
In vitro fertilization, a currently well-accepted and commonly used
27
medical technique, was created in order to treat infertility issues.
The procedure involves transferring a fertilized egg, cultured in a
28
laboratory dish, into a woman’s uterus.
Since the purpose of IVF procedures is to treat infertility, there
29
are many forms of IVF. The most traditional infertility case is when
something is preventing the sperm and the egg from fusing, so the
IVF procedure is used to overcome that hurdle by uniting the father’s
30
sperm and the mother’s egg outside the body. A more controversial
form of IVF involves the use of a donor egg, donor sperm, or both, to
produce an embryo, which is then transferred into the infertile
31
woman’s uterus.
This note will focus on the most controversial form of IVF,
involving a third party such as a surrogate who is either implanted
with an embryo created from the infertile couple’s egg and sperm, or
32
who is also the egg donor in addition to the surrogate. Because IVF
participants may combine genetic material in nontraditional ways to
produce a baby, an IVF-produced child could potentially have up to
five parents: the intended mother and father, the biological mother
33
and father, and the gestational mother or surrogate. Since the first
successful use of IVF leading to a live birth in 1978, the traditional
IVF procedure has evolved from being controversial to generally
34
undisputed.

III. Surrogacy
The emergence of IVF resulted in increased demand for
surrogates. There are two types of surrogates: the more common

27. Keith Alan Byers, J.D., LL.M., Infertility and in Vitro Fertilization A Growing
Need for Consumer-Oriented regulation of the in Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL
MED. 265, 265 (1997).
28. Id. at 274.
29. Id. at 274–75.
30. Id. at 274.
31. Id. at 275.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 276.
34. Id. at 276, 285.
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gestational surrogate and a traditional surrogate.
A gestational
surrogate is a woman who carries a child that is not genetically related
to her in any way, while a traditional surrogate acts as both the
36
surrogate and the egg donor. A small number of states have begun
regulating gestational surrogacy, which makes up ninety-five percent
37
of surrogate cases.
A major topic of regulation is how the
parenthood for the resulting child should be determined.
Due to differing state laws, regulation becomes a complex issue.
Should the gestational mother, the intended parents, or the genetic
parents be the legal parents of the child? Some states have
recognized the intended parents, the parents who intended to create
the child, as the legal parents, but have limited that recognition to
situations where the intended parents are also the genetic parents.
Some have gone even further, and limited that recognition to
situations where the intended parents are married or are a man and
38
woman, however regulation is still complex.
A. Traditional Surrogacy

Matter of Baby M was the first traditional surrogacy case to
39
capture the public’s attention. Mary Beth Whitehead had agreed to
40
carry a child for William Stern, whose wife was infertile. As the only
41
child of Holocaust survivors, Stern wanted genetic offspring. The
two entered into a contract with the terms that Whitehead would bear
the child and relinquish all her rights, and Stern would pay her
42
$10,000 upon delivery of the child to him after its birth. After giving
birth, Whitehead realized she could not give up her baby and
43
eventually asked to keep her for a week. She failed to return the
baby back to the Sterns until the baby was forcibly removed from her
44
care.

35. Types of Surrogacy, SURROGATE 411, http://www.surrogate411.com/id1.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
36. Id.
37. June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary
Risks?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 355 (2010).
38. Id.
39. Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 417 (1988); Carbone, supra note 37, at 335.
40. Matter of Baby M, supra note 39, at 412–13.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 412.
43. Id. at 414–15.
44. Id.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the surrogacy contract
45
was void due to conflict with public policy and state adoption laws.
Under New Jersey law, Whitehead was the genetic and biological
46
mother, therefore she was the legal parent of the child. According
to the court, “[o]nly adoption, not contract, could sever the parental
47
tie.” Therefore, any surrogacy contract agreement that included
Whitehead’s termination of parental rights was void under New
48
Jersey law. Whitehead remained the legal parent of the child unless
49
she wished to relinquish her rights to the father, via adoption. The
court issued its ruling in order to discourage further surrogacy
agreements at a time when surrogacy was thought of as “the creation
50
of a child for sale.” Most states have also addressed this issue, but
51
Matter of Baby M remains good law in New Jersey.
B. Gestational Surrogacy

Surrogacy became more accepted once science allowed for the
separation of genetics and gestation through gestational surrogacy;
however, the issue of who constitutes the legal parents became more
52
complicated. The case of Johnson v. Calvert involved a surrogacy
53
contract between Mark and Crispina Calvert, and Anna Johnson.
The terms of the contract were similar to the terms of the contract in
Matter of Baby M, except Calvert, not Johnson, would be providing
the egg, so therefore Calvert, the intended mother, was the genetic
54
mother of the baby. During the pregnancy, the relationship between
the parties soured and Johnson asserted that she was the child’s
55
mother.
To make its ruling, the California Supreme Court looked towards
the Uniform Parentage Act, under which maternity can be
56
determined in multiple ways.
The court held that like proof of
having given birth, presentation of blood test evidence sufficed to

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Matter of Baby M, supra note 39, at 421–22.
Carbone, supra note 37, at 335–36.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 87 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 90; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 1994).
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establish maternity.
Under the Act, both women had proof of
maternity: Calvert through genetics, and Johnson through pregnancy
58
and birth. Since both women constituted the legal mother under the
Act, the court looked at the parties’ intent as a tiebreaker to
59
determine maternity. The intent behind the surrogacy agreement
was for Johnson to help the Calverts have a child, not for the Calverts
to donate a zygote to Johnson:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child
relationship . . . she who intended to procreate the child—that
is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under
60
California law.

Therefore, under California law, Calvert was the natural mother,
61
not Johnson. At a time when gestational surrogacy was quickly
replacing traditional surrogacy, Johnson had a deep impact on
62
surrogacy as a practice.
C. Complicated Forms of Surrogacy

Further complicating the legal parentage issue in surrogacy cases
were instances where neither of the intended parents nor the
gestational surrogate was a genetic parent of the child, such as In re
63
Marriage of Buzzanca. The case involved a couple, Luanne and
John Buzzanca, who procured both a sperm and egg donor, in order
64
to create an embryo to implant in a gestational surrogate. After
implantation, but prior to the child’s birth, the Buzzancas separated
65
and John disclaimed any responsibility of the child. The issue before
66
the trial court was who had legal parentage of the child. The court
allowed a stipulation stating that the gestational surrogate was not the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 90.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Carbone, supra note 37 at 337.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998).
Id. at 1412.
Id.
Id.
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mother. They then ruled that Luanne was not the mother because
she had neither contributed genetically by providing the egg nor given
68
birth. John was not the father because he had not contributed the
69
sperm, and therefore had no genetic ties to the child. The court also
noted that neither the egg nor the sperm donors were legal parents
under the law because they consented to procreate a child for
70
someone else who intended to raise the child. By the trial court’s
71
ruling, it looked as if the child had no legal parents.
The California Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s
view that Uniform Parentage Act sets out only three ways in which a
woman can establish legal maternity—giving birth, contributing
72
genetically through her egg, or legally adopting. The appellate court
pointed to the statute, which states that “[t]he parent and child
relationship may be established as follows: (a) [b]etween a child and
the natural mother, it may be established by proof of her having given
73
birth to the child, or under this part.” The statute does not say
“shall” be established, showing that there may be other, unlisted
methods of establishing parentage. Also, the statute does not directly
refer to genetics as being one of the factors for establishing maternity,
but rather the court in Johnson construed it to include genetic
74
testing.
The trial court failed to look at how paternity can be determined
75
by multiple non-biological ties. Under the Act, paternity can be
determined if a man and “the child's natural mother are or have been
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or
76
within 300 days after the marriage is terminated . . . .” Paternity can
also be determined in many other ways, including if a man consents to
being named the father on the birth certificate or he willingly opens
77
his home to the child and proceeds as if the child is naturally his.
When a woman conceives a child through artificial insemination with
semen donated by a man other than her husband, the husband is

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1412.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1418.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1412, 1415.
FAM. § 7610 (emphasis added).
Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1415.
Id. 1416–17.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2005).
Id.
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treated as the child’s natural father so long as he consented to the
78
The Court of Appeal ruled that this law was also
conception.
applicable to IVF using a donor egg and sperm; therefore, John
Buzzanca was determined by the court to be the legal father of the
79
child.
Turning to determination of legal maternity, the court noted that
80
this can be determined in multiple ways. First, under the facts in
Buzzanca, Luanne can be viewed as similar to a husband in an
artificial insemination case, and therefore permitted to voluntarily
81
consent to being the mother of a child not biologically related to her.
Luanne consented to being the mother of the child, but even if she
had not, the court found that maternity can be determined by intent
82
according to Johnson. In Buzzanca, the child would never have
been born if the Buzzancas had not initiated and agreed to the
83
procedure. Luanne intended to be the mother of the child, and John
84
intended to be the father of the child. Therefore, the court ruled
85
that the Buzzancas were the legal parents of the child.
Viewing the case’s history, there are multiple ways for a court to
determine legal parentage. First, legal parentage can be determined
by genetics or pregnancy and birth. Second, if the two parties are at
odds, intent can be determinative of legal parentage. Third, in cases
where multiple parties are involved due to IVF and donors, consent
and intent seem to be the determinative factors.

IV. Current Law
A. State Regulation of Surrogacy

The United States differs from the United Kingdom in the legal
86
rights afforded to surrogate mothers. While the U.K. has a uniform
national position that recognizes the surrogate mother as the legal

78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2012).
79. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1421.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1412.
85. Id. at 1428.
86. See Radhika Rao, Surrogacy Law in the United States: The Outcome of
Ambivalence, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 23
(Rachel Cook & Shelley Day Sclater eds., Hart Publ’g 2003).
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mother of the child, the U.S. has no uniform policy and the law varies
87
from state to state:
[T]he law of surrogate motherhood in the United States is in a
state of flux and confusion. States have widely differing laws,
some enforcing surrogacy contracts, some banning them
entirely, and some allowing them under certain circumstances.
Many states have no laws regarding surrogacy contracts at all.
No single statutory regime has won widespread acceptance. As
a result, courts are often left to decide parenthood disputes
arising from these contracts, and have a range of theories by
88
which to do so.

State laws fall into four general categories: (1) prohibition; (2)
89
inaction; (3) status regulation; and (4) contractual ordering. States
seeking to prohibit surrogacy do so either by banning it or imposing
civil or criminal penalties on those who create or help create
90
surrogacy contracts. Examples of states that prohibit surrogacy are
91
92
Michigan and Arizona. States that would be included under the
inaction category seek to maintain the status quo by refusing to
enforce surrogacy contracts and refusing to specify rules governing
93
surrogacy. States that follow this approach do not ban surrogacy
94
contracts but allow courts to nullify them as against public policy.
States that follow status regulation allow citizens to enter into
surrogacy contracts, but include certain mandatory terms and specific
95
status relationships in those contracts.
An example might be

87.
88.

See Rao, supra note 86.
Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97, 114 (2010).
89. Rao, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2012) (“A surrogate parentage
contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.859(1) (West 2012) (“A person shall not enter into, induce, arrange,
procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for
compensation.”). Michigan also makes it a felony to enter into such an agreement and a
violator can be punished by a fine of up to $50,000 and up to five years in prison. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859(2)-(3) (West 2012).
92. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (“A surrogate is the legal mother of a
child born as the result of a surrogate parental contract and is entitled to the custody of
that child.”) Although this statute has been ruled unconstitutional, it has never been
repealed. Spivack, supra note 88, at 101.
93. Rao, supra note 86.
94. Spivack, supra note 88, at 101.
95. Id.
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mandatory terms allowing for compensation of legal and medical fees
96
but not service fees. States that enforce whatever agreement the
97
parties negotiate fall under the contractual ordering category.
With differing state laws it is often unclear whether a surrogacy
contract will be enforced. Courts have followed several different
98
theories in determining whether to enforce a surrogacy contract.
The three-parent IVF procedure creates three genetic parents,
further complicating the issue of genetic parentage and the state laws
that purport to define it.
B. Impact of the Three-Parent IVF on State Law
1. Lesbian Co-Parents

Three-parent IVF creates the novel concept of two genetic
mothers, requiring the courts to determine which mother has legal
rights to the child. The procedure raises a lot of questions such as,
what if both genetic mothers want to be considered as the legal
mother under the law? If the two women agree upon that, will the
state comply with their wishes?
Lesbian co-parents who participate in the “planned conception,
birth, and/or rearing of [their] partner’s biological child” would like to
be recognized as the legal mother alongside their partner’s biological
99
or adopted child.
Due to differing state law regarding both
surrogacy and the parental rights of lesbian co-parents, these women
will be highly affected by the possible legalization of three-parent IVF
in the United States.
Some states, such as California, Illinois and Maryland, among
100
others, are thought to be surrogacy friendly states.
California, in
particular, has no statute addressing the issue but would likely uphold

96. Spivack, supra note 88, at 101. (“Six states refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts
when the surrogate is compensated for her services. Five states have explicitly made only
uncompensated surrogacy contracts legal.”).
97. Id.
98. Id. See also supra Part III.
99. Joanna L. Grossman, Do Lesbian Co-Parents Have Rights?, VERDICT (Aug. 23,
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/23/do-lesbian-co-parents-have-rights.
100. See California Surrogacy Law, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
laws-and-legislation/entry/california-surrogacy-law (last updated Sept. 19, 2009); see also
H. Joseph Gitlin, Illinois Becomes Surrogacy Friendly, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/Illinois%20Becomes
%20Surrogacy%20Friendly.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013); see also Hilary Neiman,
Maryland: A Friendly State for Surrogacy, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON INFERTILITY
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION,
http://www.inciid.org/printpage.php?cat=thirdparty
&id=782 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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agreements that include lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
101
(“LGBT”) individuals.
In 2005, the California Supreme Court decided cases regarding
102
lesbian couples who had reproduced via surrogacy.
The court,
interpreting the Uniform Parentage Act, ruled that two women can
103
be the legal parents of a child produced via surrogacy. The court’s
reasoning recalls the reasoning used to determine paternity in
104
Buzzanca. The Uniform Parentage Act provides for determination
of paternity in several ways, including genetic testing, consent by
being named on the birth certificate, and treatment of the child as
105
one’s own.
The court again pointed to the Act’s recognition of
106
paternity in cases of artificial insemination with prior consent.
According to the court, this same reasoning should apply to all who
intend to create a child and act in as a family, and that “a person who
uses reproductive technology is accountable as a de facto legal parent
for the support of that child” because “[l]egal parentage is not
107
The holding in these cases
determined exclusively by biology.”
108
most likely applies to all members of the LGBT community.
Currently, some states refuse to recognize that a lesbian co109
Under Ohio law, for example, a
parent has parental rights.
nonparent, same-sex partner does not qualify as a “parent” under
state statute, and as a result the state does not recognize statutory
shared parenting arrangements between a parent and his or her
110
nonparent, same-sex partner.
However, a parent can voluntary

101. California Surrogacy Law, supra note 100.
102. Id. See also Eliza B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108 (2005); K.M. v. E.G., 37
Cal. 4th 130 (2005).
103. California Surrogacy Law, supra note 100; see also Eliza B., 37 Cal. 4th at 113;
K.M., 37 Cal. 4th at 134.
104. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1420–21.
105. FAM. § 7611.
106. FAM. § 7613 (“[W]ith the consent of her husband, [if] a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as
if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”)
107. Eliza B., 37 Cal. 4th at 115.
108. California Surrogacy Law, supra note 100.
109. Ohio is one example. In re Mullen, 129 Ohio St. 3d 417, 420 (2011) (“Ohio does
not recognize a parent’s attempt to enter into a statutory ‘shared parenting’ arrangement
with a non-parent, same-sex partner”). See generally Same Sex Adoption Laws by State:
Welcome to the Jungle, IT’S CONCEIVABLE (Aug. 17, 2011), http://itsconceivablenow.com/
2011/08/17/sex-adoption-laws-state-jungle-it’s-fun-games/.
110. Mullen, 129 Ohio St. 3d at 420.
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share the care, custody and control of his or her child with a non111
parent through a shared-custody agreement.
In the case of In re Mullen (Mullen), the two women in a couple
never expressly created a formal shared custody agreement, so when
parentage was disputed the court looked at whether their actions
112
implied that formal agreement was created.
Even though the coparent, Hobbs, planned for the pregnancy with the birth mother,
Mullen, was present at the child’s birth, appeared on the birth
certificate, cared for the child jointly with Mullen, acted like a family,
was named as the child’s guardian, and was given power of attorney
to make decisions for the child, the court ruled that Mullen’s conduct
113
did not create an implied shared-custody agreement.
Mullen had
never agreed to permanently give over partial legal custody of the
child and therefore, all of the custodial responsibilities that Mullen
114
gave to Hobbs were revocable. The ruling by the court has the long
term effect of leaving many parent-child relationships in doubt and
potentially unprotected.
If three-parent IVF became legal in the United States, cases such
as Mullen could be decided very differently. This is due to the fact
that some of the states that do not recognize the rights of lesbian co115
parents determine parentage by genetics. Under three-parent IVF,
both women in the lesbian couple could have genetic ties to the child,
giving them legal rights to the child under the theory of parentage by
116
genetics. Three-parent IVF would make it difficult for such states
to deny two women legal parentage of a child to whom they both
117
have genetic connections.
Custody and parentage determinations are not the only
complicated legal areas impacted by IVF techniques. Due to the
genetic tie that children will have to the donor parent, three-parent
IVF could have an impact on how United States citizenship is
determined and who constitutes a citizen.
2. United States Citizenship

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Mullen, 129 Ohio St. 3d at 420.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
Id.
Carbone, supra note 37, at 342.
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of the United States and the State wherein they reside.”
A child
born in the U.S. or ones of its territories acquires birthright
citizenship. Children born abroad to a U.S. citizen can also be
deemed a citizen of the U.S. if the following conditions are met: the
child’s parents were married at the time of the birth, one of the
parents was a U.S. citizen when the child was born, the citizen parent
lived in the U.S. for at least five years before the child’s birth, and at
least two of those five years were after the citizen parent’s fourteenth
119
birthday.
The rules differ for babies born through IVF. Even if the
mother, father or both are United States citizens, but both the egg
and sperm donors are not, then the child is not considered a United
States citizen—what matters is “the biological material, not the actual
120
parent.” As a result, if it can be proven that the donor egg or sperm
used by non-American citizens to conceive a child came from an
American citizen, the resulting child would presumably be eligible for
121
American citizenship.
Three-parent IVF could have an impact on the regulation of
United States citizenship. Although mitochondrial DNA accounts for
only a fraction of our total DNA, it still creates a genetic tie to the
woman who passes along those genes. If a woman with U.S.
citizenship donates her mitochondrial DNA to a couple from a
different country, the child has a genetic tie to a U.S. citizen. The law
does not specify the amount of shared genes the child needs to have
in order to be deemed genetically related to a U.S. citizen; therefore
three-parent IVF has the potential of creating children who would
otherwise not have U.S. citizenship.

V. Proposals for Incorporating Three-Parent IVF
into Law
If three-parent IVF becomes legal in the United States, it is
122
unclear what parental rights would be afforded to the donor parent.
Due to differing state laws, there seems to be only two options on
how to deal with this issue—create a uniform national policy or

118.
119.
120.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(g), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 2012).
See Allison Kaplan Sommer, IVF Babies Denied U.S. Citizenship, THE JEWISH
DAILY FORWARD (Mar. 21, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhoodblog/153409/ivf-babies-denied-us-citizenship/.
121. Id.
122. See supra Part IV.
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continue to allow states to create their own individual laws, whether it
is by keeping their current law or updating it based on advances in
medical technology.
123
124
Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France,
have a uniform national policy regarding surrogates and their
125
parental rights.
In the U.K. the surrogate mother retains all the
legal rights to the child, even if she is not genetically related to it,
126
unless there is a parental or adoption order. France, on the other
127
hand, makes all surrogacy agreements illegal.
Although the U.S.
could create a national uniform policy regarding surrogacy
agreements, it would be hard to do so. Unlike the U.K. and France,
the U.S. is composed of many states, all of which have certain rights
under the United States Constitution to govern activities within the
128
state. Creating a uniform policy throughout the U.S. would be the
equivalent of creating a uniform policy throughout the European
129
Union, which currently is not the case.
The alternative method would be to avoid infringing on states’
rights by allowing each state to incorporate three-parent IVF into
their existing law. Depending on how states deal with parental rights
of surrogates, either by establishing parentage through genetics, birth
or consent, the same method can be followed for three-parent IVF.
In the case of lesbian co-parents, this would mean that if the coparent is genetically related to the child, then she also has parental
rights. Therefore, states that refuse to recognize the rights of lesbian
co-parents would either be forced to allow them parental rights, or
change their state law to ban such agreements.
In regard to United States citizenship, Congress has the power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization, which it has through the

123. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 27 (Eng.).
124. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 16-7 (Fr.).
125. See Rao, supra note 86.
126. Id. See also The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 27
(Eng.) (“(1) The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in
her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the
mother of the child. (2) Subsection (1) above does not apply to any child to the extent
that the child is treated by virtue of adoption as not being the [woman’s] child . . . .”).
127. C. CIV. art. 16-7 (Fr.) (“All agreements relating to procreation or gestation on
account of a third party are void.”).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
129. See C. CIV. art. 16-7 (Fr.); see also The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,
1990, c. 37, § 27 (Eng.).
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Immigration and Nationality Act.
The way the law stands right
now, any child born outside the U.S. to a U.S. citizen donor parent is
a U.S. citizen, regardless of the fact that the child will only receive less
than one percent of his or her DNA from the citizen donor parent.
Since the Constitution reserves the right to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization to Congress, an act of Congress through an amendment
to the current law is the only way to change the current law to reflect
the medical advancement of three-parent IVF in regard to citizenship
determination.
In sum, the potential chaos that the legalization of three-parent
IVF could cause can be alleviated by the creation of a uniform
national policy on parental rights, or by federal and state
governments incorporating the medical advance in their existing law.

130.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

